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Abstract
Although pay-for-performance’s potential effect on employee performance is a com-
pelling issue, understanding this dynamic has been constrained by narrow approaches 
to pay-for-performance conceptualization, measurement, and surrounding conditions. 
In response, we take a more nuanced perspective by integrating fundamental princi-
ples of economics and psychology to identify and incorporate employee characteristics, 
job characteristics, pay system characteristics, and pay system experience into a contin-
gency model of the pay-for-performance–future performance relationship. We test the 
role that these four key contextual factors play in pay-for-performance effectiveness us-
ing 11,939 employees over a 5-year period. We find that merit and bonus pay, as well as 
their multiyear trends, are positively associated with future employee performance. Fur-
thermore, our findings indicate that, contrary to what traditional economic perspectives 
would predict, bonus pay may have a stronger effect on future performance than merit 
pay. Our results also support a contingency approach to pay-for-performance’s impact 
on future employee performance, as we find that merit pay and bonus pay can substitute 
for each other and that the strength of pay-for-performance’s effect is a function of em-
ployee tenure, the pay-for-performance trend over time, and job type (presumably due 
to differences in the measurability of employee performance across jobs). 
Keywords: pay-for-performance, merit pay, bonus pay, employee performance, contin-
gency theory, pay trend, performance measurement 
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Employee performance influences organizational success (Gardner, Wright, & Moynihan, 
2011; Wright, Dunford, & Snell, 2001). One organizational practice widely used to affect 
such employee performance is pay-for-performance (PFP; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Gerhart, 
Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009), or “pay that varies with some measure of individual or organiza-
tional performance . . .” (Milkovich, Newman, & Gerhart, 2011: 661). PFP is usually com-
posed of merit and/or bonus pay, and it exists in over 90% of firms and for most em-
ployees in those firms (Cohen, 2006). Usage is widespread, in part, because (a) monetary 
rewards are the most efficacious incentives (Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, & Denny, 1980), 
(b) PFP can direct action (Shaw & Gupta, 2007) and attitudes (Fulmer, Gerhart, & Scott, 
2003), and (c) firms often have more discretion in setting PFP than in setting pay level (Ger-
hart & Milkovich, 1990). 
PFP’s presumed link to both past and future performance (as well as to employee at-
traction and retention) explains its popularity in practice and its centrality in theoretical ap-
proaches to reward systems. In key psychological perspectives, scholars posit that PFP will 
affect performance via such mechanisms as instrumentality, which is the perceived link 
between performance and pay (Vroom, 1964), and meet obligations by the employer (Rob-
inson & Rousseau, 1994). Similarly, in fundamental economic perspectives, pay is thought 
to influence employee behavior through the creation of transactional norms (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1981), the overcoming of monitoring challenges (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
and the motivation of organizationally desirable behaviors (Lazear, 1992). Yet, despite 
widespread PFP usage, supportive PFP-relevant theories, and a meta-analytic finding that 
individual-level PFP has a weak but positive relationship with past employee performance 
(Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998), PFP efficacy is questioned by both academic re-
searchers (e.g., Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar, 2009; Lawler, 2000) and the popu-
lar press (e.g., Green, 2010; Pink, 2009). Specific concerns are that PFP is negatively related 
to performance (Ariely et al., 2009), is not motivating (Pfeffer, 1998), undermines intrinsic 
motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1980), motivates undesirable employee competition (Deming, 
1986), and is difficult to effectively implement (Lawler, 2000). 
Such differences of opinion often reflect unresolved complexity in a relationship or 
in key constructs (Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010; Schwab, 1991). We sus-
pect that both conditions are present here. First, few studies have looked at PFP as a pre-
cursor to performance; instead, most PFP studies examine performance as a precursor to 
pay, which can reveal the strength of the alignment between performance and pay, but 
not necessarily the motivational effect of PFP. Second, studies on PFP and performance 
have rarely emphasized the relevant context and contingencies that may well be integral to 
PFP’s effectiveness. Finally, the few studies that have examined PFP as a precursor to per-
formance have not taken a longitudinal and multidimensional approach to the PFP con-
struct. Hence, it is not surprising that scholars have called for a more nuanced explanation 
of how PFP influences future performance and how internal organizational constraints af-
fect its efficacy (e.g., Barkema & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). 
In response, we explore a more sophisticated approach to PFP construct validity and 
the contingencies surrounding PFP effects. We ground this examination in well-estab-
lished psychological (i.e., expectancy theory) and economic (i.e., incentive intensity prin-
ciple) rationale that, coupled with our focus on PFP context and PFP construct complex-
ity, allows us to examine the roles of time, simultaneous influences of different types of 
PFP, job type, and employee characteristics. The results reported here, which are based on 
5 years of observations for 11,939 insurance company employees, generally support our 
expanded approach to the PFP construct and our contingency-based conceptual model. 
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As such, our results support our general position that PFP, like most management strat-
egies and interventions, is inherently neither a panacea nor the road to ruin; rather, PFP 
works under certain conditions. Similarly, fundamental PFP theory from psychology and 
economics is more relevant under certain conditions. Thus, the challenge for both theory 
and practice is to identify when established PFP conceptualizing and PFP itself are most 
appropriate. 
Theoretical Development 
Key Definitions and PFP Conceptualization 
We begin with a brief description of our model’s constructs and contingent nature. No-
tably, we expand on the typical approaches to PFP conceptualization and operationaliza-
tion by including both a type and a time frame dimension. Our PFP focus includes the two 
most prevalent types of PFP (merit and bonus pay): Merit pay is an incremental increase in 
base salary used to recognize past performance (Milkovich et al., 2011), and bonus pay is a 
lump sum cash payment used to recognize past performance (Milkovich et al., 2011). Each 
rewards past performance and sets future expectations. Although alternative forms of PFP 
exist (e.g., gain sharing, profit sharing), our focus is on merit and bonus pay because they 
are the most widely used PFP tools (Cohen, 2006; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003) and are more 
closely linked to individual performance than are group- or organizational-based rewards, 
given the more direct line-of-sight between job performance and reward (Lawler, 1971). 
In terms of PFP time frame, we also examine long-term PFP effects by considering trend for 
both merit and bonus pay. Trend represents changes in levels of PFP over time—a positive 
trend means PFP increases across yearly allocations, and a negative trend means PFP de-
creases over such time. 
Analysis of expectancy theory from psychology and the incentive intensity principle 
from economics suggests five broad contextual areas that influence the efficacy of PFP 
(e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Milkovich et al., 2011; Rynes, Gerhart, & Minette, 2004). 
Our model examines four of these five contextual areas (pay system characteristics, employee 
characteristics, pay system experience, and job characteristics) and specific representations 
within each.1 One of these four contextual areas, pay system characteristics (i.e., PFP type), 
includes both merit and bonus pay. The second involves employee characteristics, which we 
represent through employee tenure. The third addresses an employee’s pay system experi-
ence regarding PFP (PFP trend), which may yield new insights into how PFP relationships 
evolve over time. The final area includes job characteristics, with sales and nonsales jobs 
chosen here to illustrate the importance of performance measurability. Finally, our model 
acknowledges organization-level factors as key contingencies, but our single-firm sample 
limits us from exploring such factors. By using established psychological and economic 
perspectives to identify PFP construct complexity and potential interdependencies involv-
ing PFP, our model stipulates conditions under which PFP is most (and least) likely to in-
fluence future performance (see Figure 1). 
Psychological Approaches to PFP 
There are a number of economic and psychological theories that attempt to address em-
ployee responses to PFP. Theories from these two disciplines often predict similar out-
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comes, even as the causal explanations differ. From a psychological perspective, expec-
tancy theory is the most common framework used to address PFP efficacy and employee 
reactions to PFP (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). The approach dictates that motivation to per-
form is a multiplicative function of valence (the perceived value of the reward), instrumen-
tality (the perceived likelihood that the desired performance will be rewarded), and expec-
tancy (the perceived likelihood that effort will result in the desired performance; Vroom, 
1964). Hence, increasing any of the three components should result in greater motivation 
to perform. Of the three, instrumentality is the most frequently studied and, for our pur-
poses, stipulates that if merit or bonus pay is commensurate with performance (i.e., a clear 
“line-of-sight” between performance and pay), employees will act on their belief that per-
formance will be rewarded by providing high levels of effort. If merit or bonus pay, how-
ever, is not commensurate with performance, instrumentality suffers and future employee 
effort will be lower (Porter & Steers, 1973; Vroom, 1964). 
Economic Approaches to PFP 
To consider the full role of PFP, it is also necessary to consider economic perspectives of 
pay as a motivator (e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Ross, 1973). Economic theory has his-
torically assumed that employees are economically rational and self-interested (Milgrom 
& Roberts, 1992). Although this assumption has been challenged as not fully accounting 
Figure 1. The Five Contextual Factors Moderating Pay for Performance’s (PFP) Effect on Future Job 
Performance. Our model acknowledges organizational-level characteristics as one of the five key 
contextual factors; however, we do not study such characteristics here, given our single-firm sample. 
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for the myriad employee behaviors that are not economically rational (Ariely et al., 2009), 
this idea that employees weigh options and act in a manner that maximizes incentive pay-
outs provides both a plausible explanation for many behaviors and a solid foundation for 
predictions.   
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) lay out five economic principles that influence incentive 
contracts (informativeness, incentive intensity, monitoring intensity, equal compensation, 
and ratchet effect). Of these, the incentive intensity principle has the most direct relevance 
to the manner in which PFP is discussed and examined here. Milgrom and Roberts use in-
centive intensity as a mechanism for determining when employers should use incentive 
contracts. They state that there are four key elements that should be considered to reach 
this decision: (a) the amount of additional money that can be achieved through increased 
employee effort, (b) the ability to measure the rewarded activities (i.e., job performance), 
(c) the employee’s risk tolerance, and (d) the employee’s responsiveness to PFP. Because 
these elements are discussed as a means for determining how intense the employer should 
make the PFP contingency, they also implicitly provide insight into the conditions that in-
fluence employee response to PFP. In particular, they suggest critical boundary conditions 
for when PFP should be successful. 
PFP–Future Performance Relationship Contingencies 
Both expectancy theory and the incentive intensity principle suggest that PFP should en-
hance future performance because employees exert effort based on expected resultant re-
wards (Schaubroeck, Shaw, Duffy, & Mitra, 2008). To improve the practical and conceptual 
understanding of PFP effects on future performance, we operationalize the PFP construct 
more broadly and provide a perspective that qualifies the relevance of standard theories 
underlying PFP usage. This contingency perspective is primarily grounded in aspects of 
the incentive intensity principle and expectancy theory that provide conceptual rationale 
for when, why, and how PFP influences future employee performance. We pull aspects 
from each framework to develop an integrated model of the PFP construct and the factors 
that affect PFP efficacy. 
To better understand merit pay and bonus pay effects on future performance, we ex-
plore four of Figure 1’s five components. These components were chosen as proxies to 
explore the four fundamental, within-firm aspects that may influence an employee’s re-
sponse to a PFP system. Underlying our model is the theoretical notion that these contex-
tual components affect the instrumentality and incentive intensity that influence employee 
effort and future performance. Hence, we argue that the employees’ resultant effort is not 
simply a function of organizational pay policy or the employees’ pay, as is often assumed 
in PFP research. Rather, effort and performance are also dependent on employee charac-
teristics (e.g., employee tenure), employee experience within the system (e.g., PFP trend), 
PFP system characteristics (e.g., simultaneous merit and bonus), and job characteristics 
(e.g., sales/nonsales jobs). 
Pay System Characteristics, PFP, and Future Performance 
Pay system characteristics: Merit pay and bonus pay main effects. While our focus here is on 
PFP contingencies, we first establish the baseline cases for PFP main effects. Merit pay is 
commonly awarded annually, based on yearly performance reviews. Merit pay rewards 
the behavior during the previous performance period (usually one year) by increasing fu-
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ture salary levels. Similar to merit pay, bonus pay is usually awarded annually, based on 
yearly performance. Unlike merit pay, bonus pay does not permanently change an em-
ployee’s base salary (Sturman & Short, 2000) or a firm’s fixed labor costs (Kahn & Sherer, 
1990). Rather, it is a one-time lump sum payment in response to prior performance. 
The theory-based arguments for merit and bonus pay representations of PFP, in gen-
eral, are similar. The influence of various types of PFP depends on the degree to which 
prior allocations of PFP had been related to the performance preceding them (Gerhart & 
Rynes, 2003), which is an instrumentality argument. PFPs’ influence also can be character-
ized as a function of the degree to which employees believe that their increased efforts will 
result in an outcome that generates the merit reward from the organization (a point made 
in the context of economics by Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, but which also illustrates the ex-
pectancy component from expectancy theory). Similarly, prior PFP will lead employees 
to want to work to fulfill their perceived reciprocal obligation to the firm (Maertz & Cam-
pion, 2004; Shaw, Dineen, Fang, & Vellella, 2009). In contrast, pay incommensurate with 
performance can result in lower effort expenditure and performance. In addition, the pre-
ferred amount of PFP (merit or bonus) can be inferred through the valence component 
from expectancy theory (which involves the perceived value, utility, or satisfaction associ-
ated with the reward) and from the portion of the incentive intensity principle that states 
that optimal incentive intensity depends on whether the incremental profitability created 
by additional employee effort is higher for the employer (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). That 
is, under the assumptions that, all else equal, more money yields greater perceived value 
for the employee and profitability for the employer, both expectancy theory and the incen-
tive intensity principle assume that larger PFP percentage increases will yield more moti-
vation to perform. 
Interestingly, the empirical support for merit and bonus pay is not as compelling as 
the strong conceptual foundation for PFP might suggest. Discrepant findings cloud con-
clusions about merit pay research, and consequently, debate exists as to its efficacy. For 
instance, Kopelman and Reinharth (1982) studied branch offices of a financial services or-
ganization and found that the stronger the link between performance rating and merit 
pay reward within a branch, the greater the subsequent average performance within that 
branch; in contrast, Pearce, Stevenson, and Perry (1985), in research widely cited as a dem-
onstration that merit pay is not motivational, conclude that merit pay plans in Social Secu-
rity branch offices were not related to subsequent branch performance. Lawler (2000: 154), 
believing that PFP is possible conceptually but often flawed in implementation, states that 
merit pay “does little to motivate performance”; similarly, Pfeffer (1998) referred to the 
idea that individual incentive pay can motivate behavior as a “myth.” Yet these discrep-
ant conclusions may be attributed, at least in part, to merit pay implementation, research 
design, and the salience of the rewards, rather than problems endemic to merit pay (e.g., 
Gerhart et al., 2009; Mitra, Gupta, & Jenkins, 1997). Indeed, in reviewing the merit pay re-
search, Gerhart et al. (2009: 263) conclude that the little research addressing merit pay is 
“primarily positive.” Given this, and the clear theory-based support from psychology (ex-
pectancy theory) and economics (the incentive intensity principle), on balance we predict, 
Hypothesis 1: Merit pay will be positively associated with future performance. 
As for bonus pay, there is surprisingly little relevant empirical research, despite the po-
tential cost savings of bonuses to companies, relative to merit pay, and the apparent moti-
vational and performance benefits suggested by theory (Heneman, 1992; Sturman & Short, 
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2000). The few existing employee bonus pay studies (e.g., Banker, Lee, Potter, & Sriniva-
san, 2000; Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Park & Sturman, 2012; Schwab 
& Olson, 1990) are generally supportive of the idea that bonus pay is positively related to 
performance. Banker et al. (2000), for example, found that sales productivity increased fol-
lowing implementation of a bonus program. Similarly, Kahn and Sherer (1990) found that 
bonus pay positively affected future performance, although the relationship was stronger 
for high-level managers than for low-level ones (which is consistent with our emphasis on 
the importance of PFP context). Overall, given the supporting theory and limited empiri-
cal work, we predict the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Bonus pay will be positively associated with future performance. 
Pay system characteristics: Merit pay and bonus pay comparison. Although the conceptual 
rationales for Hypotheses 1 and 2 are quite similar, we expect that the two reward schemes 
will have differing effects, even when the dollar value is the same. In traditional economic 
perspectives, where employees are expected to be economically rational actors, employees 
should prefer, and thus be more motivated by, merit increases due to the long-term com-
pounding effect (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Because a merit increase is a salary raise, any 
subsequent merit increases build off of increasingly larger base salaries. In contrast, bo-
nuses earned in one year have no implications for the size of bonuses in subsequent years. 
Put another way, a 5% merit increase at the end of Year 1, because it is built into yearly sal-
ary, is paid out as part of yearly earnings in all subsequent years, while a 5% bonus at the 
end of Year 1 contributes nothing to earnings in subsequent years. Hence, an economically 
rational actor should prefer merit increases over bonus payments because, over the long 
term, merit will lead to increasingly greater earnings. 
Yet, alternative predictions arise from recognizing that individuals, subject to cogni-
tive heuristics and biases, do not necessarily act in a long-term economically rational man-
ner (Kahneman, 2011). In such situations, merit and bonus pay may have different levels 
of valence (the perceived value of the potential reward) and instrumentality (the perceived 
link between performance and pay). Bonuses are typically paid out as lump sums, while 
merit increases are spread across the year’s paychecks. Hence, a $5,000 bonus provides a 
considerable sum that can immediately be used to satisfy many needs. In contrast, a $5,000 
merit increase, though worth much more than the bonus if the employee “does the long-
term math,” results in only modest increases to each paycheck (e.g., $5,000 spread over 24 
bimonthly paychecks is only $208.33 per check). Valence could thus be greater in the bo-
nus condition, as employees may appreciate the more salient and immediate windfall na-
ture of the bonus payment more than the relative subtlety of merit benefits that are spread 
out over the year. To the extent that this salience does yield greater valence for bonuses, 
instrumentality perceptions may also favor bonuses. The perceived link between perfor-
mance and pay may be deemed to be stronger when the pay component is deemed to be 
more compelling. 
Similarly, the logic of the endowment effect, in which a good increases in perceived 
value as a result of ownership of the good (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990), is consis-
tent with greater valence (and thus greater motivation) associated with bonuses. Typically, 
bonuses are fully allocated to the employee shortly after the year in which the bonus-earn-
ing performance was assessed. While this employee possesses the entire bonus early in the 
following year, an employee earning a merit increase receives relatively small increments 
over the course of the following year, fully acquiring the merit increase only at the end of 
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the second year. Thus, because the perceived value of a good instantly increases when the 
good is obtained (Kahneman et al., 1990), the endowment effect suggests that employees 
may value bonuses more than an equivalently sized merit increase because only the bonus 
is fully (and obviously) in-hand during the year in which it is designed to motivate per-
formance. This increased value, as valence in expectancy theory, translates to greater mo-
tivation to perform. In addition, the endowment effect is often explained by prospect the-
ory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), in that the owned good is framed from a potential loss 
perspective and we fear avoiding losses much more than we value making gains. Bonuses 
will in fact be “lost” the next year if performance does not continue at a high level. Merit 
increases, in contrast, are likely to be thought of as gains that are gradually acquired over 
time, but are not at risk of loss (since merit is built into future salary and tends to be more 
likely to be considered as an entitlement; Milkovich et al., 2011). Therefore, it is reasonable 
to conceive of employees as fearing the loss of bonuses more than they value the acquisi-
tion of merit increases, further suggesting that bonuses can be more valued and more mo-
tivating than merit pay. 
In sum, traditional economic rationale (e.g., the incentive intensity principle) sug-
gests that employees should be more motivated by merit increases than by bonus pay. 
The expectation is that rational actors will perform the necessary calculations to under-
stand and act upon what is in their long-term best interests. However, substantial re-
search now indicates that actors often do not act as economically rational regarding their 
long-term economic outcomes, as had long been assumed in traditional economics mod-
els (e.g., Ariely, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008). The endowment effect and loss aversion, which are inconsistent with classical 
economics, indicate that bonuses should be valued more, leading to greater valence and 
subsequent motivation to perform. Given the fundamental role of valence in expectancy 
theory and the considerable empirical support in behavioral economics for the endow-
ment effect and loss aversion (e.g., Kahneman, 2011), our hypothesis reflects this latter 
interpretation. 
Hypothesis 3: Bonus pay will have a stronger positive association with future performance than will 
merit pay. 
Pay system characteristics: Multiple PFP types present. Most employees respond to the en-
tire PFP package rather than to just a single component (Nyberg et al., 2010). Extending 
earlier work investigating multiple PFP types as independent effects (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & 
Balkin, 1989; Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Park & Sturman, 2012; Schwab & Olson, 1990), we ex-
amine potential interdependence among merit pay and bonus pay. While no PFP research 
has addressed such interdependence, conceptual support exists in both the psychologi-
cal and economic literatures. In the former, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) maintained 
that because employees desire favorable outcomes they tend to respond to unfavorable 
outcomes by making sense of the situation, which often entails seeking additional infor-
mation. When in this sense-making mode, employees are increasingly influenced by new 
data. In one test of this sense-making proposition, Trevor and Wazeter (2006) investigated 
pay equity perceptions and found that being low in the internal pay hierarchy (an unfavor-
able pay outcome) was associated with greater influence of position in the external pay hi-
erarchy. Similarly, we expect that an unfavorable PFP outcome will yield such sensemak-
ing efforts, and, subsequently, employees will be increasingly influenced by a second PFP 
outcome. 
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Such sense-making regarding multiple pay outcomes is also likely influenced by the 
calculation that when one pay component is smaller, the other makes up a relatively larger 
proportion of total PFP, which suggests a substitution effect. The substitution effect is a 
core concept in economics (Becker, 1965). Individuals are thought to be willing to substi-
tute goods consumed indifferently, as long as these goods provide the same economic ben-
efit (i.e., goods that fall along the same indifference curve). The substitution effect should 
similarly apply to dual PFP components, in that one PFP outcome of interest (e.g., bonus) 
will, in the presence of an unfavorable PFP outcome (e.g., low merit), become increas-
ingly important to providing a certain threshold level of utility (economic benefit). This 
seems particularly likely in situations, such as our sample, where merit and bonus pay are 
awarded at similar times of the year. 
Hypothesis 4: When merit pay is low (high), the bonus pay–future performance relationship will be 
stronger (weaker). 
Employee Characteristics, PFP, and Future Performance 
Employee characteristics: Tenure. Employee characteristics comprise the second broad con-
textual area in our PFP study (see Figure 1). Current PFP influences future performance 
because employees exert effort, in part, based on their understanding and confidence in 
the organization’s reward system (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Schaubroeck et al., 2008). This 
understanding and confidence will vary as a function of the individual differences that 
employees bring to the job. One such employee characteristic that influences percep-
tions of a PFP system is employee tenure. From an expectancy theory perspective, expe-
rience within the PFP system will affect an employee’s perception of, and expectation of, 
instrumentality, as employees will likely believe that prior experience will be represen-
tative of future experience. Similarly, an underlying assumption in the incentive inten-
sity principle is that the strength of the relationship between prior incentives and prior 
performance will affect the employee’s expectations of receiving future rewards. Thus, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the longer an employee’s tenure, the more well-formed 
her or his attitudes and beliefs about pay practices. Although it could be argued that 
such well-formed pay practice beliefs may initially lead to heightened disappointment 
when pay expectations are violated, research suggests that such short-term disappoint-
ment would ultimately have relatively little influence, as employees with more tenure 
and subsequent understanding of the pay system will be more likely to see the disap-
pointing outcome as an anomaly. Indeed, short-term outcomes have been shown to war-
rant less attention when there is evidence that future long-term outcomes will be posi-
tive (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). Hence, at high tenure the single most recent PFP 
outcome should be a less telling determinant of expectations for future rewards, instru-
mentality, and motivation. In contrast, low-tenured employees have less historical em-
ployment outcome evidence to draw on when developing their views about future PFP 
outcomes. Consequently, their most recent PFP outcome is likely to carry greater weight. 
We also note that traditional economics perspectives would reach a similar conclusion if 
it were assumed that employees could calculate the net present value of the dollars that 
they were earning. In such a calculation, dollars earned earlier in one’s career would be 
worth more than dollars earned later, and thus at low levels of tenure, employees would 
find additional monetary rewards more motivational.2 
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Hypothesis 5a: When tenure is low, the merit pay–future performance relationship will be stronger. 
Hypothesis 5b: When tenure is low, the bonus pay–future performance relationship will be stronger. 
Pay System Experience, PFP, and Future Performance 
Employee experiences within the PFP system. Another characteristic tied to the employee that 
may affect the influence of PFP is the employee’s experience with the pay system. Prior 
pay system experience creates expectations about the degree to which future performance 
and PFP will be linked (Schaubroeck et al., 2008). However, most PFP studies examine 
only a single instance of pay, ignoring long-term effects (Jenkins et al., 1998); and to the de-
gree that long-term effects influence employee expectations of future PFP, results of cross-
sectional studies potentially underestimate the link between pay and future employee per-
formance. Thus, we examine long-term PFP main effects and then discuss how long-term 
PFP influences employee reaction to the most recent PFP outcome. Key to both issues is 
the premise that an employee’s experience in the PFP system will affect the employee’s 
future effort, due to the expectation that prior pay system experiences will predict future 
pay system experiences. This expectation is presumed in both psychology and economic 
perspectives. 
Employee experiences within the PFP system: PFP trend as a direct effect. The unique effects of 
trends have been demonstrated in studies of salary change effects on satisfaction (Hsee, 
Abelson, & Salovey, 1991), job satisfaction change on turnover intention (Chen, Ploy-
hart, Thomas, Anderson, & Bliese, 2011), job satisfaction trajectories on turnover (Liu, 
Mitchell, Lee, Holtom, & Hinkin, 2012), and performance trends (and subsequent pay 
trends, given the samples) on turnover (Harrison, Virick, & William, 1996; Sturman & 
Trevor, 2001). The principles underlying such trend effects are the beliefs that employ-
ees are motivated to maximize material outcomes from the employment relationship 
(Thibaut & Walker, 1975) and that trends in employment outcomes affect expectations of 
the likelihood of future outcomes (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). Thus, when merit and 
bonus pay trends (i.e., the trajectories, or slopes, of pay over time) are positive, employ-
ees should experience increased confidence that they will continue to be rewarded for 
their performance, thereby strengthening instrumentality perceptions. In contrast, when 
a PFP trend is negative, employees may lose confidence in PFP systems. Consequently, 
greater PFP trends should lead to increased instrumentality perceptions, effort, and fu-
ture job performance. 
Hypothesis 6a: Merit trend will be positively associated with future performance. 
Hypothesis 6b: Bonus trend will be positively associated with future performance. 
Employee experience within the PFP system: PFP trend as a moderator. As stated, when PFP 
trends are positive, employees expect a continuation of the positive relationship between 
performance and rewards. Such positive experience-driven beliefs about future outcomes 
also result in employees responding less to a single short-term outcome (Brockner & Wi-
esenfeld, 1996). Hence, when PFP and performance have been commensurate in the past, 
influence from a current PFP outcome will be diminished because the positive past expe-
rience engenders greater optimism about the likelihood of a strong future performance–
pay relationship, largely regardless of current circumstances. In contrast, increasingly un-
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favorable PFP experiences (i.e., negative trend in the performance–pay relationship) will 
often lead to attributions of unfair or unreliable resource allocation procedures and, sub-
sequently, trepidation regarding the likelihood of receiving appropriate future rewards 
based on performance. Hence, because employees responding to unfavorable processes 
and outcomes seek out and are highly influenced by new information (Brockner & Wie-
senfeld, 1996), employees enduring negative PFP trends will place greater emphasis on 
the short-term PFP outcome. Put differently, the short-term outcome will substitute for the 
longer term PFP in importance and, consequently, have a larger effect on subsequent effort 
and performance. From an economics perspective, this is a similar principle to the substi-
tution effect described in Hypothesis 4. 
Hypothesis 7a: When merit trend is high, the merit pay–future performance relationship will be 
weaker. 
Hypothesis 7b: When bonus trend is high, the bonus pay–future performance relationship will be 
weaker. 
Job Characteristics, PFP, and Future Performance 
Job characteristics within the PFP system: Job type. The fourth and final broad contextual area 
that we examine as a PFP contingency factor is job characteristics (see Figure 1). As de-
scribed, optimal incentive intensity is a function of the marginal returns to employee effort, 
the ability to measure the rewarded activities, employee risk tolerance, and the responsive-
ness of the employee to PFP (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). The performance measurability 
element in the incentive intensity principle is particularly interesting as a contingency fac-
tor in PFP effectiveness, as jobs within organizations clearly vary on this dimension. Im-
plicit in the performance measurability stipulation is the assumption that PFP should have 
a greater effect on motivation and future performance when the performance that is to be 
rewarded can be more precisely measured. This is consistent with predictions arising from 
the instrumentality aspect of expectancy theory, where the effort-inducing perceived line-
of-sight between performance and pay should be greater when (and thus in jobs when) 
performance is seen as more objective. 
While there are no indices of job-specific performance measurability to rely on to iden-
tify where various jobs fall on this dimension, a few jobs are commonly seen as providing 
more objective indicators of performance. Among these are sales jobs, which often entail 
a verifiable, countable indicator of performance (e.g., items sold, sales dollars), and thus 
can yield a clearer assessment of whether past performance has been commensurately re-
warded (i.e., instrumentality). Certainly all sales jobs in the organization do not necessar-
ily yield greater performance transparency than all nonsales jobs. On average, however, 
while most jobs do not provide particularly good results-based measures at the individ-
ual level (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005), sales jobs are more likely to have straightfor-
ward results-based outcomes that can be directly measured (Anderson & Oliver, 1987). 
Both the incentive intensity principle (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992) and instrumentality per-
spectives (Lawler, 1971; Vroom, 1964) suggest that PFP will more effectively influence in-
dividual motivation and performance in jobs where performance can be more precisely 
measured (i.e., in sales functions). Consequently, we compare the PFP–future perfor-
mance relationships in jobs where performance measurability should be high (e.g., sales 
jobs) with the relationships in jobs where, on average, performance will not be as easily 
assessed (e.g., nonsales jobs). 
12 N y b e r g ,  P i e P e r  ,  & T r e v o r  i N  J o u r n a l  o f  M a n a g e M e n t   (2014) 
Hypothesis 8a: The effect of merit pay on future performance will be stronger in job functions where 
performance can more objectively be measured than in job functions where job performance is 
not as objectively measurable. 
Hypothesis 8b: The effect of bonus pay on future performance will be stronger in job functions 
where performance can more objectively be measured than in job functions where job perfor-
mance is not as objectively measurable. 
Method 
Participants 
The data are from a large U.S.-based insurance company. The company made available 
human resource (HR) data on all employees who were not paid on commission and were 
positioned below the director level for the period between January 1, 2001, and December 
31, 2006. After removing observations that did not have at least three consecutive years 
of performance data, the final count consisted of 11,939 employees from 517 different de-
partments located in 574 offices located throughout the United States. Since we are inter-
ested in how current PFP affects future employee performance, we required a minimum 
of 2 years of observations to begin analysis. Thus, all employees with only one year of ten-
ure are necessarily excluded from the analysis. Employees in the final sample ranged in 
age from 19 to 74 years, with a mean of 42 years, averaged 12 years of tenure with the or-
ganization (minimum 2 years and maximum 53 years), worked in 719 specific job classifi-
cations across 22 job family categories, and represented 17 different levels from entry-level 
positions through senior vice presidents (just below director level). About three fourths of 
the employees were women, and the sample was closely split between exempt and non-
exempt employees. Employees earned, on average, about $47,000 per year in base salary.3
Measures 
Merit pay. We calculated merit pay as the proportional change in salary from one year to the 
next—this change is based on the employee’s performance.4 The company allocates merit 
pay by providing the manager with a budgeted merit pay guideline, with specific pay in-
crease percentages tied to specific performance levels. While these guidelines also take into 
account the employee’s current pay and pay relative to the external market, employee per-
formance is, by design (and by far), the primary determinant of merit pay (performance 
and subsequent merit pay correlated at .7). Managers are then given the discretion to set 
employee merit pay within plus or minus 15% of the budgeted values but must seek spe-
cial permission to exceed these parameters. According to conversations with senior com-
pensation executives at the company, such adjustments rarely occur. 
Bonus pay. Bonus pay was the proportion of salary paid on an annual basis to employees as 
a lump sum reward for individual performance during the previous period. The firm allo-
cates bonus pay based on an employee’s salary, pay grade, and performance, and all em-
ployees are eligible for bonus pay. Similar to the case with merit pay, performance is the 
primary bonus pay determinant, with performance and subsequent bonus correlated at .7. 
An employee’s strategic business unit’s performance can also (minimally) affect the size of 
the bonus (if any). Managers have discretion to adjust bonus pay within plus or minus 10% 
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of the budgeted values, but generally allocate the precise budgeted value. Bonus pay and 
merit pay are generally awarded annually and at similar times of the year. 
Merit trend. Merit trend was the slope of the line of best fit resulting from regressing (sep-
arately for each employee) observation-year merit pay on the consecutive years that an 
employee was in the sample prior to and including the observation year. For instance, for 
an employee with independent variable data from 2001 to 2004, the year 2004 merit trend 
value was the slope of the regression line fitting four data points: Year 1 in sample, 2001 
merit pay; Year 2 in sample, 2002 merit pay; Year 3 in sample, 2003 merit pay; and Year 
4 in sample, 2004 merit pay. This operationalization mirrors Sturman and Trevor’s (2001) 
performance trend measure. 
Bonus trend. Bonus trend was created in the exact same manner as merit trend, but using bo-
nus pay, instead of merit pay, in the calculation. 
Tenure. Employee tenure was operationalized as the number of years with the organiza-
tion. It was created by subtracting the employee’s start date from the focal date and con-
verting that number to an integer. Average tenure was 11.77 years, and the range of em-
ployee tenure was 2 years to 53 years. 
Sales jobs. The sales jobs variable is used as a proxy for jobs with greater performance mea-
surability and represents the family of jobs that fall within the sales domain. All employ-
ees across the company are categorized in 1 of 22 unique job families. The sales job family 
encompasses a cross-section of employees across many grade levels and geographic loca-
tions. In total, 2,099 employees within this sample were categorized in the sales job family. 
The sales job variable is 1 of the 22 different job classifications that are controlled for in all 
analyses and addressed in greater detail in the description of covariates. 
Future performance. We used annual employee performance extracted from company data. 
Performance scores, which are generated by an employee’s immediate supervisor, vary 
from 75 to 125, with higher scores representing better performance. Supervisors rate em-
ployees based on three achievement ratings (i.e., degree of achievement, degree of impor-
tance of the achievement, and degree of difficulty of the achievement) and four behav-
ior ratings (i.e., daily role behavior, skills, effectiveness, and consistency). Based on these 
seven criteria, supervisors choose a specific rating score between 75 and 125. Managers are 
trained on the appropriate techniques for conducting performance ratings, and employee 
merit and bonus allocations are tied directly to these ratings. 
The organization attempts to achieve a normal distribution of performance scores within 
supervisor and across the organization. In our sample, this resulted in a mean performance 
score across employees of 102.20. The distribution of employee ratings was as follows: 75 to 
84 (i.e., lowest performance), 1%; 85 to 94, 15%; 95 to 105, 68%; 106 to 115, 15%; and 116 to 
125 (i.e., highest performance), 1%. To evaluate the reliability of supervisor evaluations, we 
first estimated the mean interyear performance evaluation correlation (.53). Entering the em-
ployee average number of performance ratings (M = 4.18) into the Spearman–Brown predic-
tion formula led to a predicted reliability of current performance ratings of .87. 
Future performance, which was the dependent variable in all equations, was an employ-
ee’s performance rating in year t + 1 (i.e., the year following the year in which our indepen-
dent variables were measured). 
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Covariates. Average performance was the mean employee performance rating across peri-
ods up through and including year t. Average performance was the key control variable in 
all future performance predictions. Without such a control, any PFP effects could be in-
terpreted as merely indicating that better performers tend to both receive PFP and per-
form well in the future. In addition, we included covariates that are expected to influ-
ence both PFP and future performance. We used a dummy variable for male (1 = male) 
to account for possible gender differences in PFP and performance. We also included 
age, measured in years, because it can be related to performance and to ensure that ten-
ure was not simply proxying age in our analysis. In addition, organizations can manage 
(and pay) exempt (those employees who are not covered by the Fair Labor Standards 
Act) and nonexempt employees differently (Gerhart & Trevor, 1996; Lepak & Snell, 1999; 
Trevor & Nyberg, 2008), and this employee distinction may be associated with different 
levels of performance evaluation; therefore, we created an exempt variable by coding ex-
empt workers as 1 and nonexempt workers as 0. We included average promotions, which 
can lead to pay (Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997) and performance changes, and sal-
ary to account for the effects of positional importance. We also accounted for job family 
using dummy variables to represent the 22 different job classifications that jobs are bun-
dled into within the company. These job families are functionally aligned, and according 
to senior HR executives at the company, employees are likely to look within a job fam-
ily to make pay comparisons. To capture the degree that supervisors differentially tie 
pay with performance in any single year, we created a variable that we termed supervisor 
merit alignment, by taking the coefficient resulting from regressing merit pay—separately 
for all observations within each year and supervisor combination— on performance, sal-
ary, and exempt status (all in year t). The regression coefficient within each year and su-
pervisor combination was applied to each individual observation in that grouping (thus 
controlling, for example, for a supervisor being particularly careful in 2002 to create vari-
ance in both performance ratings and in the merit allocations according to those ratings). 
We created supervisor bonus alignment with an identical procedure after substituting bo-
nus pay for merit pay in the regressions. 
Analyses 
The model used to test the relationship between PFP and future job performance is repre-
sented by the following equation: 
Job performance(t + 1) = f (merit payt , bonus payt , merit trendt ,  bonus trendt , 
tenuret , sales jobt , sext , aget , exemptt , promotiont ,  
salaryt , supervisor merit alignmentt , supervisor  
bonus alignmentt , average performancet )                      (1) 
where t represents the year in question for the independent variables and job perfor-
mance (t + 1) represents future performance. 
We analyzed pooled cross-sectional time-series data by regressing future performance 
from year t + 1 on the independent variables from year t. Because a Hausman test (χ2 = 
656.14, df = 29, p < .0001) suggested the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, we used 
fixed effects estimation for our regression analyses (Greene, 2003; Halaby, 2004; Hausman, 
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1978). We clustered fixed effects around supervisor (N = 2,267) to partial out time-invariant 
supervisor effects that might otherwise bias results because supervisors are partially re-
sponsible both for assigning year t merit and bonus pay and for rating future performance 
in year t + 1 (note that the fixed effects models account for time-invariant supervisor ef-
fects, while the supervisor alignment control variables described above account for time-
varying supervisor differences). All variables, with the exception of the dummy variables 
(e.g., male, exempt, sales job), were standardized.5 
Results 
Descriptive Data, Intercorrelations, and Baseline Models 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in their natural metrics to facilitate 
interpretation, and Table 2 presents correlations. It is worth noting that while performance 
over time was highly correlated, substantial variance in future performance remained af-
ter accounting for past performance. For instance, while average performance (the perfor-
mance covariate in our models) correlated with future performance at .49, it still explained 
less than one quarter of the variance in future performance (i.e., r 2 = .24). As expected, 
there was also a high correlation between exempt and salary (r = .76). Although high cor-
relations among independent variables can lead to multicollinearity concerns, all variables 
used in the equations returned a value on the variance inflation factor (VIF) test of less 
than 3, suggesting that multicollinearity was not a problem (Neter, Wasserman, & Kut-
ner, 1985). In addition, removing variables to reduce collinearity did not substantively af-
fect our results. 
Pay System Characteristics, PFP, and Future Performance 
Table 3 provides multivariate tests of the PFP effects on future performance. Model 1 re-
veals that average performance, tenure, male, age, and salary were statistically signifi-
cantly related to future employee performance. Supporting Hypotheses 1 and 2, the merit 
pay (b = .14, p < .001; Model 2) and bonus pay (b = .49, p < .001; Model 3) coefficients were 
positive and statistically significant. The .14 merit pay coefficient indicates that a one stan-
dard deviation increase in merit pay (.04, 4%, or $1,894) was associated with a .14 stan-
dard deviation increase in performance rating, which is a .74 performance rating point in-
crease (.14 times the 5.30 future performance standard deviation). Increasing bonus pay by 
one standard deviation (.03, 3%, or $1,420) was associated with a .49 standard deviation 
increase in performance rating, which is a 2.60-point increase on the performance rating 
scale. The positive merit and bonus pay effects also emerge in Model 4, where both terms 
are included to test our Hypothesis 3 prediction of a stronger PFP effect on future perfor-
mance for bonus pay than for merit pay. Here the bonus pay coefficient (b = .47) is over 5 
times greater and significantly different (p < .001) from the merit pay coefficient (b = .09), 
supporting Hypothesis 3. 
Next, we examined the extent to which a merit by bonus pay interaction exists (Hy-
pothesis 4), which was grounded in the notion that PFP’s influence is a function of the en-
tire PFP package. Model 5 in Table 3 provides support for this hypothesis, as the negative 
and statistically significant (b = –.04, p < .001) interaction term indicates that the bonus pay 
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effect was stronger when merit pay was low. Figure 2 illustrates this interaction, and a sim-
ple slopes analysis revealed that increasing bonus pay one standard deviation was asso-
ciated with a .44 standard deviation increase in future performance when merit pay was 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable                                              M              Mdn                SD               Min             Max 
Future performance  102.20  102.00  5.30  75.00  125.00 
Average performance  102.35  102.00  4.51  80.00  120.75 
Tenure  11.77  8.00  8.80  2.00  53.00 
Male  0.24  0.00  0.43  0.00  1.00 
Age  42.10  41.96  10.29  19.63  74.03 
Exempt  0.46  0.00  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Sales job  0.16  0.00  0.37  0.00  1.00 
Promotion  0.10  0.00  0.16  0.00  0.75 
Salary  47,344  42,050  18,937  16,600  127,600 
Supervisor merit alignment  0.36  0.25  0.96  –17.44  16.97 
Supervisor bonus alignment  0.37  0.32  0.69  –8.70  16.28 
Merit pay  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.43 
Merit trend  0.00  0.00  0.04  –0.28  0.41 
Bonus pay  0.06  0.05  0.03  0.00  0.25 
Bonus trend  0.00  0.00  0.02  –0.19  0.20 
Nindividual = 11,939. Values are in their natural unstandardized metrics to ease interpretation. 
 
Table 2. Correlations 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
1 Future performance  — 
2 Average performance  .49  — 
3 Tenure  .04  .13  — 
4 Male  .01  .04  .00  — 
5 Age  –.06  –.01  .46  –.05  — 
6 Exempt  .10  .19  .06  .33  –.03  — 
7 Sales job  .01  –.04  –.03  –.16  –.00  –.26  — 
8 Promotion  .05  .07  –.23  .04  –.28  .19  –.05  — 
9 Salary  .18  .33  .21  .44  .08  .76  –.21  .06  — 
10 Supervisor merit alignment  .00  –.01  –.05  .04  –.07  .09  –.04  .04  .04  — 
11 Supervisor bonus alignment  .04  .04  .01  .05  –.01  .08  –.04  .02  .11  .09  — 
12 Merit pay  .13  .05  –.27  .04  –.31  .11  –.06  .24  –.03  .13  .03  — 
13 Merit trend  .01  –.11  –.05  .01  –.03  –.02  –.02  –.26  –.07  .07  .02  .57  — 
14 Bonus pay  .38  .35  .14  .24  .03  .39  –.19  .04  .59  .04  .15  .07  .00  — 
15 Bonus trend  .10  –.09  .04  –.06  .04  –.05  –.05  .02  –.08  .01  .03  –.02  –.05  .39  — 
Nindividual = 11,939. Based on the last observation per employee. Correlations with absolute values greater than 
.02 are statistically significant at p ≤ .05. 
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Table 3. Fixed Effects Regression of Future Performance on Employee and Pay-for-Performance (PFP) 
Characteristics 
                            Perft1    Perft1       Perft1         Perft1       Perft1       Perft1      Perft1        Perft1
  H1  H2  H3  H4  H5a  H5b  
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Constant  .62  .67  .19  .23  .26  .63  .18  .24 
 .97  .97  .91  .91  .91  .96  .91  .91 
Tenure  –.03**  –.00  –.02*  –.00  –.00  –.00  –.00  .02** 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
Male  –.10***  –.11***  –.10***  –.10***  –.10***  –.10***  –.09***  –.09*** 
 .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02 
Age  –.08***  –.06***  –.07***  –.06***  –.06***  –.06***  –.07***  –.06*** 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
Exempt  –.06*  –.11***  –.01  –.04  –.04  –.11***  –.02  –.05 
 .03  .03  .03  .03  .03  .03  .03  .03 
Promotion  –.00  –.01*  –.01*  –.02**  –.02**  –.01*  –.01*  –.02** 
 .01  .01  .00  .00  .00  .01  .00  .00 
Salary  .11***  .17***  –.17***  –.12***  –.13***  .17***  –.15***  –.10*** 
 .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02 
Supervisor merit  .01  –.00  .01  –.00  .00  –.00  .01  –.00 
alignment  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
Supervisor bonus  –.01  –.01  –.01  –.01  –.01  –.01  –.01  –.01 
alignment  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
Average performance  .48***  .47***  .42***  .41***  .41***  .47***  .42***  .41*** 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
Merit pay   .14***   .09***  .10***  .14***   .11*** 
  .01   .01  .01  .01   .01 
Bonus pay    .49***  .47***  .48***   .51***  .50*** 
   .01  .01  .01   .01  .01 
Bonus pay × merit pay      –.04***    –.06*** 
     .01    .01 
Merit pay × tenure       .03***   .03*** 
      .01   .01 
Bonus pay × tenure        –.06***  –.07*** 
       .01  .01 
F  223  231  349  347  338  225  341  323 
Adj. R 2  .22  .24  .32  .32  .33  .24  .32  .33 
Δ in adj. R 2   .01*a  .09***a   .01*b  .01*c  .01*d  
Nobs = 26,788. Variables were standardized prior to the analyses, with the exception of male, exempt, job 
family, and year. All fixed effects regressions were fixed on supervisor. Coefficients for 22 job family dummy 
variables and 3 years included in each calculation are not presented due to space considerations, but are 
available from the lead author. 
a. Comparison to Model 1. 
b. Comparison to Model 3. 
c. Comparison to Model 2. 
d. Comparison to Model 3. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001
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high and a .52 increase when merit pay was low, an 18% stronger effect. (Alternatively, in-
creasing merit pay one standard deviation resulted in a .06 standard deviation increase in 
future performance at high bonus pay and a .14 increase in performance at low bonus pay, 
which was a 133% stronger effect than when bonus pay was high.) 
Employee Characteristics, PFP, and Future Performance 
We found mixed support for the hypothesized influence of employee characteristics (i.e., 
tenure) on PFP effects in Table 3’s Models 6 and 7. Hypotheses 5a and 5b predicted that 
PFP would be differentially related to future performance across employee tenure. Al-
though statistically significant, the positive merit pay by tenure coefficient in Model 6 did 
not support Hypothesis 5a, as the prediction that the merit pay–future performance rela-
tionship would be stronger when tenure was low would require a negative sign on the in-
teraction term. The negative bonus pay by tenure interaction coefficient in Model 7, how-
ever, was statistically significant and negative (b = –.06, p < .001), supporting Hypothesis 
5b. As depicted in Figure 3, and based on a simple slopes analysis, increasing bonus pay 
one standard deviation corresponded to a .45 standard deviation increase in future per-
formance when employee tenure was high (one standard deviation above the mean), but 
the same bonus pay increase resulted in a .57 standard deviation increase in future perfor-
mance when tenure was low (one standard deviation below the mean), which was a 27% 
stronger effect. 
Pay System Experience, PFP, and Future Performance 
Our Figure 1 framework also stipulated that employees’ prior pay system experience 
would influence their future performance directly and through its moderating effect on 
PFP. Table 4 provides the relevant analyses. Although Model 2 reveals that the prediction 
of a positive bonus trend effect in Hypothesis 6b was not supported, Model 1 shows that 
the positive merit trend effect on future performance was statistically significant (p < .01), 
Figure 2. Merit Pay as a Moderator of Bonus Pay on Future Performance  
(Hypothesis 4) 
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supporting Hypothesis 6a. Specifically, the .03 coefficient means that a one standard de-
viation increase in merit trend resulted in a .03 standard deviation increase in future per-
formance, or a .16 performance rating increase. We note the importance in such trend re-
search of controlling for the current level of the variable (merit pay and bonus pay in our 
case), to ensure that trend effects are not inferred when the trend may in fact be only a 
proxy for the most current occurrence. 
Table 4 also presents PFP trend interactions with the most recent PFP. We found sup-
port for Hypotheses 7a and 7b, which predicted that the effect of merit pay and bonus pay 
on future performance would be weaker when merit and bonus trends were high. The 
merit pay by merit trend (Model 4) and bonus pay by bonus trend (Model 5) interactions 
were both negative and statistically significant (p < .001), indicating support for the hy-
potheses (i.e., short-term PFP effects were weaker when PFP trend was high). In the top 
graph in Figure 4, increasing merit pay one standard deviation was associated with a .12 
standard deviation increase in future performance when merit trend was high. The effect 
for the same merit pay increase was twice as great, or a .24 standard deviation increase in 
future performance, when merit trend was low. Similarly, in the bottom graph, increasing 
bonus pay one standard deviation was associated with a .45 standard deviation increase 
in future performance when bonus trend was high and a .57 increase when bonus trend 
was low, which was a 27% stronger effect. The results remained consistent when modeling 
both interactions simultaneously (Model 6). 
Job Characteristics, PFP, and Future Performance 
Finally, in Hypotheses 8a and 8b we predicted that the effect of PFP would be stronger in 
those jobs where performance is more precisely measured. To explore these hypotheses, 
we first tested the PFP by sales jobs interactions. Table 5’s Models 1 and 2 reveal support 
for both hypotheses, as the statistically significant (p < .001) interaction term coefficients in-
dicate that both merit pay and bonus pay have positive effects on future performance that 
are of greater magnitude for individuals in sales jobs. To more clearly show how our mod-
els changed according to job function, we then split the sample into sales jobs employees 
(N = 2,099) and  nonsales jobs employees (N = 10,060; splitting the sample was warranted, 
Figure 3. Employee Tenure as a Moderator of Bonus Pay Effects on Future Performance  
(Hypothesis 5b)  
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Regression of Future Performance on Pay System Experience 
                                                        Perft1         Perft1         Perft1         Perft1         Perft1         Perft1
                                                        H6a           H6b                            H7a            H7b 
 1  2  3  4  5  6 
Constant  .68  .20  .25  .67  .23  .28 
 .96  .91  .91  .96  .91  .90 
Tenure  –.00  –.02  –.00  –.00  –.02*  –.01 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
Male  –.11***  –.10***  –.10***  –.11***  –.10***  –.10*** 
 .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02 
Age  –.06***  –.07***  –.06***  –.06***  –.07***  –.06*** 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
Exempt  –.11***  –.01  –.04  –.12***  –.01  –.05 
 .03  .03  .03  .03  .03  .03 
Promotion  –.00  –.01*  –.01  –.00  –.01  –.01 
 .01  .00  .01  .01  .00  .01 
Salary  .17***  –.18***  –.13***  .18***  –.18***  –.11*** 
 .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .02 
Supervisor merit alignment  –.00  .01  –.00  –.00  .01  –.00 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
Supervisor bonus alignment  –.01  –.01  –.01  –.01  –.01  –.01 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
Average performance  .47***  .41***  .41***  .48***  .41***  .42*** 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01 
Merit pay  .12***   .07***  .18***   .12*** 
 .01   .01  .01   .01 
Merit pay trend  .03**   .02**  .08***   .06*** 
 .01   .01  .01   .01 
Merit pay × merit pay trend     –.06***   –.04*** 
    .00   .00 
Bonus pay   .51***  .48***   .51***  .47*** 
  .01  .01   .01  .01 
Bonus pay trend   –.04**  –.02   –.01  .02 
  .01  .01   .01  .01 
Bonus pay × bonus pay trend      –.06***  –.06*** 
     .01  .01 
F  225  339  328  229  331  319 
Adjusted R 2 within  .24  .32  .33  .25  .32  .33 
Δ in adjusted R 2  .00a  .00b   .01*c  .00d 
Nobs = 26,788. Variables were standardized prior to the analyses, with the exception of male, exempt, job fam-
ily, and year. All fixed effects regressions were fixed on supervisor. Coefficients for 22 job family dummy vari-
ables and 3 years included in each calculation are not presented due to space considerations, but are avail-
able from the lead author. 
a. Comparison to Model 2, Table 3. 
b. Comparison to Model 3, Table 3. 
c. Comparison to Model 1, Table 4. 
d. Comparison to Model 2, Table 4. 
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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given the Chow test, which indicated that the difference in the two subgroups’ sets of co-
efficients was statistically significant, p < .001; Schenker & Gentleman, 2001). In support of 
Hypothesis 8a, the positive effect of merit pay was statistically stronger (p < .001) in sales 
jobs (b = .21; see Model 6) than in nonsales jobs (b = .12; see Model 3). Similarly, and sup-
porting Hypothesis 8b, the positive effect of bonus pay was statistically greater (p < .001) 
in sales jobs (b = .73; see Model 7) than in nonsales jobs (b = .45; see Model 4). Notably, the 
bonus pay and merit pay effects for sales jobs were the strongest PFP effects anywhere in 
our analyses. 
Discussion 
In this study, we theorized about and examined the relationship between PFP and future 
employee performance. We used a longitudinal approach to explore two undertheorized 
Figure 4. Pay-for-Performance (PFP) Trend as a Moderator of PFP on Future Performance  
(Hypotheses 7a and 7b)   
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Table 5. Fixed Effects Regression of Future Performance on Pay-for-Performance (PFP) by Job Function 
                                                                   Nonsales Jobs (3, 4, 5)              Sales Jobs (6, 7, 8) 
                                        Perft1     Perft1       Perft1       Perft1       Perft1       Perft1      Perft1       Perft1     
                                        H8a       H8b         H8a         H8b                        H8a        H8b 
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Constant  .14***  .13***  .13***  .13***  .11***  .42***  .17*  .26** 
 .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .08  .08  .08 
Tenure  –.00  –.02*  .00  –.01  .00  –.04  –.08***  –.05* 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .02  .02  .02 
Male  –.11***  –.09***  –.11***  –.10***  –.10***  –.10  –.09  –.10 
 .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .06  .05  .05 
Age  –.06***  –.07***  –.07***  –.07***  –.07***  –.05**  –.06***  –.05*** 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .02  .02  .02 
Exempt  –.13***  –.03  –.15***  –.04  –.05  –.12  –.13  –.18* 
 .03  .03  .03  .03  .03  .10  .09  .09 
Promotion  –.01*  –.01*  –.01  –.01  –.01*  –.04*  –.02  –.03 
 .01  .00  .01  .01  .01  .02  .02  .02 
Salary  .14***  –.17***  .14***  –.18***  –.14***  .37***  .18*  .31** 
 .02  .02  .02  .02  .02  .10  .09  .09 
Supervisor merit  –.00  .01  .00  .01  .00  –.04  –.03  –.05 
alignment  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .03  .03  .03 
Supervisor bonus  –.01  –.01  –.00  –.01  –.01  –.04  –.03  –.03 
alignment  .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .02  .02  .02 
Average performance  .47***  .42***  .48***  .43***  .42***  .45***  .36***  .35*** 
 .01  .01  .01  .01  .01  .02  .02  .02 
Sales jobs  –.01  .06* 
 .02  .02 
Merit pay  .12***   .12***   .08***  .21***   .15*** 
 .01   .01   .01  .02   .02 
Bonus pay   .46***   .45***  .44***   .73***  .71*** 
  .01   .01  .01   .03  .03 
Merit pay × sales jobs  .07*** 
 .02 
Bonus pay × sales jobs   .17*** 
  .02 
F  542  825  536  787  741  86  162  156 
Adjusted R 2 within  .24  .32  .25  .32  .33  .20  .32  .33 
Δ in adjusted R 2       .00**a  .14***b 
Observations  26,788  26,788  22,096  22,096  22,096  4,692  4,692  4,692 
Nobs = 26,788. Variables were standardized prior to the analyses, with the exception of male, exempt, job fam-
ily, and year. All fixed effects regressions were fixed on supervisor. Coefficients for 22 job family dummy vari-
ables and 3 years included in each calculation are not presented due to space considerations, but are avail-
able from the lead author. 
a. Comparison to Model 3. 
b. Comparison to Model 4. 
* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001
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and little-researched aspects in the PFP literature—PFP operationalization and a contin-
gency perspective—to clarify the PFP–future performance relationship. To this end, we 
first expanded PFP’s operationalization to include multiple PFP types and time frames, 
arguing that both short- and long-term measures of PFP influence the PFP–future per-
formance relationship. Second, we identified five broad contextual elements relevant to 
PFP and then hypothesized about and tested four of them: pay system characteristics, em-
ployee characteristics, pay system experience, and job characteristics. 
Our results speak to the importance of both conceiving of PFP more broadly and con-
sidering how context may affect the influence of certain PFP types. The present findings 
support PFP efficacy, as they show that both merit and bonus pay are positively associ-
ated with future performance. Our results also indicate that bonus pay appears to be more 
influential than merit pay and compensatory effects exist between PFP components. Spe-
cifically, when one PFP type (e.g., merit pay) is low, the other (e.g., bonus pay) becomes a 
more potent predictor of future performance. 
The results also support the notion that the effects of PFP evolve over time to influence 
future performance. In addition to merit trend’s positive effect on future performance, 
both merit trend and bonus trend moderated the PFP–future performance relationship, in-
dicating that employees’ pay system experience influences the effects of current PFP. Spe-
cifically, current PFP (merit pay or bonus pay) had a smaller positive effect on future per-
formance when the relevant PFP trend was high. While it is a new finding that employees 
are less influenced by a single short-term PFP disappointment (or success) when the PFP 
future seems bright, it is also consistent with a broad literature on outcome favorability 
(e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). Overall, the long-term PFP findings speak to the im-
portance of researchers and practitioners conceiving of PFP effects from more than a short-
term perspective and suggest that there is likely to be a PFP duration effect that has not 
previously been studied. 
In addition to the moderated effects that emerged through a longer term perspec-
tive on the PFP construct, several other interdependencies provided contextual informa-
tion on when PFP will lead employees to perform better. Employee tenure moderated 
the effects of current PFP, supporting the general principle that employee character-
istics can influence the PFP– future performance relationship. We found evidence for 
this interaction when PFP was operationalized as bonus pay (but not when operation-
alized as merit pay). We note, however, that employees who deem their merit increases 
and bonuses to be dissatisfying or inequitable are more likely to leave the organiza-
tion (e.g., Tekleab, Bartol, & Liu, 2005), thereby gradually creating a tenured cohort that 
may be somewhat more optimistic about future PFP outcomes than their low-tenured 
colleagues. As such, our considerations regarding the role of tenure may be affected. 
Moreover, since observations with only a single year of tenure could not be analyzed, 
we might have found stronger support for our rationale had it been possible to include 
lower-tenured employees. 
Implications for Theory 
We synthesize aspects of psychological (primarily via expectancy theory) and economics 
(primarily via the incentive intensity principle) theories to identify crucial contextual in-
fluences on the PFP–future performance relationship. Our conclusions are consistent with 
the idea that instrumentality, valence, and incentive intensity are all factors in directing 
employees’ effort and thus affecting their future performance. Our findings are consistent 
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with recognition that employees do not always have time or all of the information to deter-
mine the “appropriate” effort to exert (Schwab, Olian-Gottlieb, & Heneman, 1979). Thus, 
combining psychological- and economic-based tools presents a novel mechanism for un-
derstanding how, when, and why PFP works. For example, our conclusions provide in-
sight into inconsistencies in PFP and other motivation-related research, such as why Van 
Eerde and Thierry’s (1996) meta-analytic findings found weaker than expected expectancy 
theory effects across studies. By stipulating conditions under which expectancy theory 
predictions should be weaker via reduced valence and instrumentality, our work may pro-
vide explanation for such results. 
Our findings on merit and bonus pay interdependence also expand our knowledge 
about PFP boundaries concerning multiple employment outcomes by showing that em-
ployees react to more than a single PFP component. This addresses a gap concerning inter-
dependencies among PFP types. Results are consistent with research on trade-offs among 
general distributive justice outcomes (i.e., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Trevor & Wazeter, 
2006) and among pay outcomes, such as position in multiple pay hierarchies (Trevor & 
Wazeter, 2006). Our finding that the bonus pay effect on future performance is greater 
when merit pay is low thus speaks to a larger literature on multiple employment outcomes 
(pay and otherwise), is consistent with a substitution effect among PFP types in terms of 
motivating performance, and highlights the limitations of solely considering PFP and its 
motivational processes from a single PFP component perspective. 
Our results also suggest theoretical challenges to traditional pay and economic para-
digms. In these paradigms, pay has often been considered a transactional event. However, 
as the long-term PFP results show, pay relationships evolve over time. This could affect 
how we think about pay because it may be that long-term pay takes on the attributes of 
relational rather than transactional events. This suggests that theorists may want to con-
sider the potential relational implications of pay, particularly when considered over time, 
which may differ from the traditional repercussions of pay associated with purely eco-
nomic transactions. 
Overall, our demonstration of the value of considering context in the PFP–future em-
ployee performance relationship provides a unique vehicle for addressing discrepancies in 
previous PFP research. For example, while our results support the position that merit pay 
is positively related to future performance (e.g., Gerhart et al., 2009), they also shed light 
on why many studies may have struggled to find these results. This is, in part, because the 
merit pay effect on future performance appears to be related to the roles of bonus pay and 
merit pay over time. Thus, studies that do not take these contextual factors into account 
may produce little consensus regarding the influence of merit (and bonus) pay. 
Implications for Practice, Limitations, and Future Research 
In addition to contributing to theory, our work also has practical implications. Manag-
ers want to entice maximum employee performance, and PFP practices are a primary tool 
used to achieve this goal. Our results provide evidence that PFP is associated with future 
performance, but has important limitations. Future performance appears more favorably 
associated with bonus than with merit pay. Contrary to conventional wisdom and tradi-
tional economic models of rational self-interest, our results suggest that employees may 
be more motivated to improve performance when bonus pay is the carrot. Furthermore, 
by awarding more bonus pay, relative to merit pay, firms would have more flexibility in 
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managing cash flow (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). By moving to higher percentages of bo-
nus pay, companies may be able to increase productivity (through better employee perfor-
mance) while generating greater cash flow flexibility, which means that bonus pay can be 
particularly advantageous for an organization trying to mitigate expenditures during fluc-
tuating organizational business cycles (Gerhart & Trevor, 1996). 
As an example of the practical manifestations of this difference, we use a simplified 
cost– benefit analysis. A reasonable assumption in such an analysis is that a one standard 
deviation increase in employee performance is worth approximately 60% of an employ-
ee’s salary to the company (Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau, & Gerhart, 2003). In our sample, 
this suggests that increasing performance one standard deviation for an average employee 
is worth approximately $28,406 to the company. Based on our results, when accounting 
for merit and bonus pay together (Table 3, Model 4), mean employee performance (102.2) 
will increase about 2.44% (or .47 standard deviations) when employees receive bonus pay 
one standard deviation above the mean (9%, or $4,261). This equals a $13,351 (i.e., .47 times 
$28,406) gross benefit to the company (and a $9,090 net benefit), or a return on investment 
of about 213%. If merit pay is increased to the same dollar value as bonus pay, the pre-
dicted result is a 0.46% increase in mean performance (.09 standard deviations), equal to 
a $2,557 gross benefit at a cost of $4,261, or about a 40% loss on investment. This suggests 
that firms can receive more “bang for their buck” by rewarding with bonuses. 
We use this simple illustration to highlight the larger bonus main effect, rather than to 
suggest that merit pay is not a worthwhile practice. In fact, firms that do not offer merit 
pay may have problems attracting and retaining high quality employees (which is not ac-
counted for in our abbreviated example). Research indicates, for example, that it is the top 
performers who are most likely to decide to quit as a result of salary growth that is incom-
mensurate with performance (Nyberg, 2010; Trevor et al., 1997). Moreover, a more com-
plete utility analysis would necessitate accounting for not only merit (and bonus) effects 
on attraction and retention, but also the future performance implications of merit trend, 
bonus trend, and the interaction between merit and bonus pay (see Sturman et al., 2003, for 
a comprehensive approach to cost–benefit analysis with PFP). 
Largely paralleling the psychological rationale, the merit–bonus interaction can be in-
terpreted as a substitution effect. We found that if one PFP type (e.g., merit pay) is low, 
then employees will be more responsive to the other PFP type (e.g., bonus pay). However, 
it is also possible that our results simply show that employees tend to respond to the larger 
payout (with perception of payout magnitude partially a function of the relative bonus 
and merit sizes), rather than act in strict accordance to substitution effect stipulations. Fu-
ture research is needed to explore how PFP components affect employee performance rel-
ative to the entirety of the PFP payout. 
One key to the relative bonus and merit effects is the lump sum aspect of bonus pay-
ments. While we derived our hypotheses based on loss aversion and endowment effects 
associated with receiving the lump sum bonuses, related explanations are also worth not-
ing. Employees may become more accustomed to salary increases spread across pay pe-
riods, or may perceive these two components differently in terms of organizational obli-
gations; employees may view merit pay as a common obligation that should be fulfilled 
(e.g., an entitlement), whereas bonus pay may be seen as a reward that needs to be earned 
yearly. In addition, the one-time bonus may give employees a more vivid goal to strive 
toward. Although an equivalent dollar value ought to be valued more by an employee 
when delivered via merit pay, due to the potential for compounding the increase in fu-
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ture periods, our results suggest that employees may not respond as expected. One lim-
itation is that our results may be partially driven by the size of PFP. That is, if merit pay 
differentiated more between high and low performers, its effects might be larger (Mitra 
et al., 1997). Similarly, more could be done to examine the role that job complexity plays 
in influencing these relationships since it has been shown that employee responses can 
vary across jobs (Maltarich, Nyberg, & Reilly, 2010). However, if our results generalize, 
then it could be argued that bonus pay should be the preferred organizational incentive. 
Future research is of course needed. For example, because merit pay and bonus pay are 
both used to motivate performance in the company studied here, and are interdependent, 
research examining merit pay and bonus pay in organizations that use one without the 
other may offer additional insight into the merit versus bonus investment choices that or-
ganizations face. 
One potential effect not examined in this study involves supervisor effects. Super-
visors may influence the PFP–future performance relationship through a variety of ac-
tions. To the extent that supervisors are poor evaluators of talent, we would expect that 
the PFP–future performance relationship would necessarily be weaker because em-
ployees would not have confidence that their performance would be accurately adjudi-
cated. Similarly, to the extent that supervisors were incapable or unwilling to differen-
tiate among employee performance, employees may lose confidence in the process and 
thus not be as motivated by PFP. We were unable to test these possibilities in our sam-
ple, but we did try to account for potential rater heterogeneity by fixing on supervisor in 
our fixed effects regressions. 
The current study also presents a glimpse into a gap in our knowledge about the role 
that PFP plays in influencing the majority of employees who, particularly compared with 
executives, represent an understudied group of workers. Our results show that PFP is as-
sociated with future employee performance even for lower ranking employees. Thus, to 
maximize employee performance, managers should consider using PFP for jobs through-
out the organization. However, our data did not distinguish between individual and col-
lective effort. Employee evaluations within our sample are based on individual perfor-
mance, meaning that further work needs to be conducted to see how our results apply in 
situations that are more team oriented. 
This study may also indicate value in expanding PFP research to the broader human 
capital resource literature where it is increasingly evident that human capital, as a unit’s 
resource, can lead to performance differentiation (Nyberg, Moliterno, Hale, & Lepak, 
2014). For instance, future pay research could consider PFP effects on human capital re-
sources. Such an application may be similar to recent unit level turnover theory advance-
ments (e.g., Hausknecht & Holwerda, 2013; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013). These new turnover 
theories have advocated considering turnover at the collective level while including time 
and the reciprocal influences of hiring and turnover on the quality and quantity of a unit’s 
human capital resource (Reilly, Nyberg, Maltarich, & Weller, in press). Likewise, based on 
the results reported here regarding the motivational effects of PFP, future PFP research 
may benefit from examining the sorting and retention effects of PFP systems on establish-
ing and maintaining a unit’s human capital resource. 
We acknowledge that our examination of PFP effects in sales jobs versus nonsales jobs, 
though likely indicative of job characteristics as an important contingency factor in the ef-
ficacy of PFP, is not necessarily a test of performance measurability and incentive inten-
sity. While the results are consistent with these principles, it is not possible in our sample 
to determine if the outcomes result from job differences in the performance measurabil-
P a y - f o r -P e r f o r m a N c e ’ s  e f f e c T  o N  f u T u r e  e m P l o y e e  P e r f o r m a N c e     27
ity aspect of the incentive intensity principle or from self-selection into sales/nonsales jobs 
(i.e., employees more motivated by pay may tend to pursue certain types of jobs). Addi-
tional competing explanations are also possible (e.g., managers in sales functions better us-
ing PFP to motivate employees). It is also the case that to the extent that our sales jobs do 
not have measurable output, then the results supporting our hypothesis may be based on 
something other than what we expected. 
Finally, we emphasize that our data are derived from a single firm, and thus our results 
may not generalize to other firms or other industries. For instance, if the firm evaluated 
here is unusually adept (poor) in implementing PFP policies and communicating these po-
lices to employees, then the results found using this firm may be more (less) supportive of 
PFP than we would expect in other firms. Similarly, different firms may exhibit (by design 
or default) different merit pay versus bonus pay relationships. This general limitation of 
using only a single firm is somewhat mitigated by the large number of employees, offices, 
jobs, and locations. 
Conclusion 
Our results demonstrate that the value of PFP cannot be understood without taking a more 
nuanced view of the PFP construct and context. Two commonly used PFP components 
(merit and bonus pay), as well as their cumulative effects over time, were linked to future 
employee performance. Important interdependencies existed among PFP components 
(e.g., the merit pay by bonus pay interaction), and bonus pay appears to be more influen-
tial than previously discussed, as it was a substantially better predictor of future perfor-
mance than was merit pay. In addition, PFP was more effective in jobs where performance 
can be more easily measured. Finally, our results provide evidence that PFP efficacy must 
be addressed using both economic and psychological perspectives. These perspectives and 
our empirical analyses lead us to conclude that PFP’s effect on future performance, as well 
as the applicability of PFP predictions derived from sound PFP-relevant theory, can be 
substantially influenced by employee characteristics, job characteristics, pay system char-
acteristics, and pay system experience. As such, we believe our study makes clear that re-
searchers and practitioners alike should turn their energies toward understanding when 
PFP works, rather than if PFP works. 
Notes 
1. A combined psychological (i.e., expectancy theory) and economic investigation (i.e., incentive in-
tensity principle) into pay-for-performance (PFP) yields five factors that can influence the efficacy 
of PFP. In addition to the four that we examine (i.e., employee characteristics, job characteristics, pay 
system characteristics, and pay system experience), organizational idiosyncrasies, which we cannot 
examine due to our single firm sample, can also influence PFP efficacy. 
2. We thank an anonymous reviewer for leading us in this direction. There is an alternative explana-
tion for why tenure (particularly as associated with age) may lead to differences in responsive-
ness to PFP. Lower tenured employees are likely to be paid less. Because these employees may 
then find that each marginal dollar is more necessary for accumulating necessary goods than 
might someone who has been there longer (and is paid more), the same PFP percentage could 
lead lower tenured employees to respond more to PFP than would higher tenured employees. 
Thus, we control for age and salary to try to account for these concerns. At the reviewer’s advice, 
we also checked for the interaction between age and merit and age and bonus. In both cases, as 
expected, age returned results very similar to tenure. 
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3. We chose not to adjust the dollar values for inflation, which would effectively have replaced 
“no” merit increase with a pay cut. Furthermore, inflation was low during the study window 
and adjusting for inflation yields no material differences in our results, but complicates the 
interpretation. 
4. Conversations with senior management at our focal company assured us that all salary increases 
were based on employee performance. While some companies build nonperformance factors 
such as cost-of-living increases into “merit” increases, senior management at the focal company 
informed us that such factors played no role in their merit pay decisions. 
5. We note that there were a number of possibilities to fix on. In addition to supervisor, we also fixed 
on department (517), location (574), job type (719), and job family (22) as potential robustness 
checks. Substantively different effect sizes did not exist across analyses. We chose to fix on super-
visor because supervisors have responsibility for determining performance ratings and influence 
PFP. Fixing on supervisor, while also controlling for supervisor PFP alignment and job family, 
represented the most thorough analysis. We included job family dummy variables because ac-
cording to senior HR executives at the company where we acquired the data, employees will pri-
marily compare themselves with others within job family to determine if their pay is commen-
surate with others. 
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